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One More Effect of NAFTA - A
Multilateral Extradition Treaty?
I. Introduction
"Shocking and unconscionable" is what a Quebec appellate
judge has called a Michigan minimum sentencing law.' The
Quebec appellate court in United States v. Jamieson2 has declared
that an American working at a restaurant in Quebec will not be
extradited because extraditing the American would violate the
tenets of Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms.' Faced with
a similar situation in Mexico, although the suspect in question was
not American, United States officials kidnapped a Mexican
national.4
Extradition will become an increasingly important issue since
the United States, Mexico, and Canada, now linked economically
through North American Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter
"NAFTA"), share common borders.' Although Canada and
Mexico do not share a border, with the recent development of
NAFTA, the absence of a unified extradition treaty for the
NAFTA actors will prove to be troublesome. As a result of the
multilateral NAFTA agreement, now may be the right time for a
multilateral extradition treaty between the United States, Mexico,
and Canada.
NAFTA is an economic agreement intended to create an
expanded and secure market for goods and services produced in
the United States, Mexico, and Canada.6 In particular, NAFTA
proposes to "liberalize trade in goods and services and expand
1. Anne Swardson, Quebec Court Finds a U.S. Drug Sentence Shocking to
Canadian Sensibility, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1994, at A13.
2. Id.; United States v. Jamieson (1992), [1992] 73 C.C.C.3d 460.
3. Geoff Baker, Michigan Drug Law Shocks Judge; Quebec Appeal Court
Rules U.S. Fugitive May Stay Here, THE GAZETrE (Montreal), Aug. 27, 1994, at
Al.
4. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
5. All barriers to trade will be eliminated. North American Free Trade
Agreement, Sept. 6, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 289, 296 [hereinafter NAFTA]. The United
States, Canada, and Mexico signed NAFTA in September 1992. Id. On
November 17, 1993, the U.S. House of Representatives approved NAFTA. Id.
6. Id. at 297.
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investment opportunities in all three countries"7 and strengthen the
cooperation between the three nations! The repercussions of
NAFTA, however, are not limited to economic effects.
Much media attention and discussion have focused on the
employment consequences resulting from the economic merger of
the three nations.9 The cultural influence Mexico and Canada will
now have on the United States is also a concern."l Additionally,
immigration issues have come into the spotlight regarding border
control and new legislation." Further, Mexico changed its
environmental laws in an attempt to appease many environmental-
ists concerned that U.S. companies will take their business to
Mexico and escape tough U.S. environmental regulations.12 The
criminal effects of NAFTA also have sparked debate. 3 There-
fore, while NAFTA's purpose is to ensure the prosperity of the
U.S., Mexican, and Canadian economies, its effects are not limited
to economic consequences.
One effect may be the presence of Mexican nationals in
Canada. Illegal immigration is predicted to increase by 100% as a
result of NAFrA.14 Consequently, as the number of illegal immi-
7. Ann Low, Determining NAFTA 's Impact on Your Business, MEX. TRADE
AND LAW REP., Oct. 1, 1992.
8. NAFTA, supra note 5, at 297.
9. James Klockow, U.S. Puts NAFTA Toll at 926 Jobs Lost in State, NEWS
TRIB., Sept. 24, 1994, at C7. See also Alejandro Sobarzo, NAFTA and Human
Rights in Mexico, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865 (1994) (discussing labor issues
affecting NAFTA).
10. Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-trade Issues
in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 391,
393 (1993).
11. Alan C. Nelson, NAFTA: Immigration Issues Must be Addressed, 27 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 987 (1994).
12. Agreement between United States and United Mexican States for Environ-
mental Cooperation, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. 10827, at 2. Further, the
U.S. - Mexico Border Cooperation Commission was created in 1993. Agreement
for Establishment of A Border Environment Cooperation Commission and North
American Development Bank, Nov. 18, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1545. Finally, a
subsequent agreement to protect the environment was signed by the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1480.
13. See Laurie L. Levinson, NAFTA: A Criminal Justice Impact Report, 27
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 843 (1994).
14. Jorge G. Castaneda & Rafael Alarcon, Perspective on Free Trade: Workers
Are a Commodity, Too, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1991, at B5. The prediction
concerning increased illegal immigration is based upon a continued flow of
Mexicans. A conservative estimate by a UCLA researcher predicts that 850,000
families working in Mexican agriculture will be displaced by the implementation
of NAFTA. Id. As these workers are displaced it is likely that they will make
their way into the United States and Canada. The expected increase in illegal
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grants increases and Mexicans make their way across national
borders, it is likely that immigration effects will be felt in Cana-
da.1
5
Illegal immigration will also affect many aspects of society.
Indeed, welfare, crime, education, and the environment are likely
to be affected by NAFTA's effect on illegal immigration.16 As
NAFTA creates jobs for Mexicans and utilizes Mexican labor
resources," there will be displaced Mexican workers seeking
better lives past the borders of the maquiladoras. 18
NAFTA fails to address the possibility that a displaced
Mexican worker who either has been charged with or has commit-
ted a crime may enter Canada in search of economic opportunity.
If this situation occurs, should the Mexican national who now lives
in Canada be extradited or should this economic relationship
created by NAFTA assume that a foreign national should be
subject to the jurisdiction of the nation in which he or she is
apprehended? Since no extradition agreement currently exists
between Canada and Mexico, the international relationship
between the two nations needs to be addressed by a written
agreement. Further, the extradition history and policies between
the United States and Mexico and the United States and Canada
differ. Due to the multilateral economic relationship created by
NAFTA, the existing bilateral extradition treaties are not viable.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the history of the United
immigration is 2.4 million to 3 million persons. Castaneda & Alarcon, at B5.
15. The author does not claim that the potential scenario of Canadians
entering Mexico will not become a problem. However, current immigration
statistics indicate that it is more likely that Mexicans will continue to illegally enter
Canada and the United States rather than Canadians illegally entering Mexico.
16. Nelson, supra note 11, at 987. The United States and Mexico share a 2,000
mile common border, a combined population of 300 million people and a flow of
illegal immigrants in the millions. Id. Nonetheless, NAFTA does not address this
vital issue.
17. It is reported that as of January 1, 1994, NAFTA has resulted in, the loss
of 170 jobs for Americans because these jobs have been relocated to Mexico.
Klockow, supra note 9, at C7.
18. Maquiladoras are American-owned factories located just beyond the
Mexico - U.S. border in Mexico. Maquiladoras & the Border Environment
Prospects for Moving From Agreements to Solutions, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 683, 683 (1992). The workers are Mexicans who produce finished and
partially-finished goods at a reduced duty on only the value added to the product
manufactured in Mexico. Id The goods are sent to the United States to be
completed and sold. Id. The U.S. corporations use maquiladoras because the
pollution standards are not as stringent and the labor costs are cheaper in Mexico.
Id. Furthermore, the U.S. corporations do not have to abide by American labor
regulations in Mexico. Id.
1995]
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States - Canada and the United States - Mexico extradition treaties.
This Part further examines recent extradition case law involving the
existing treaties. Part III will then review other multilateral
extradition treaties and their applicability to the NAFTA situation.
This Part will specifically focus on the European Convention on
Extradition and the Afro-Asian extradition treaty. Next, Part IV
will compare the Mexican and Canadian extradition treaties
focusing on the possible interrelationship between these two
bilateral treaties. Finally, Part V will predict the success of a
multilateral extradition treaty between the NAFTA nations.
II. History of Bilateral Extradition Treaties Involving the
United States, Canada, and Mexico
Nations have sovereignty over their borders in order to control
the flow of people into their territories.19 Further, under the
principle of quidquid est in territorio est etiam de territorio, a state
has supreme authority over all individuals and property within its
boundaries.2' However, treaties may be written by neighboring
nations creating a relationship of compromise and understanding
with respect to this flow of people.21 This relationship, if created
through a written agreement such as a treaty, imposes legal obliga-
tions upon each nation.22 In particular, the purpose of an extradi-
tion treaty is to facilitate "the surrender by one nation to another
of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its
own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other,
which, being competent to try and punish him, demands the
surrender."'  Thus, when a national attempts to flee from the
19. SATYA DEVA BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 27 (1968). This legal postulate is rooted in the Law of Nations. H.W.
BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 413-17 (2d ed. 1953). However, sovereignty is
limited to the absence of other agreements reached by the international parties.
BEDI at 33.
20. Id. at 28.
21. Id. at 33.
22. Id. at 33 (citing H. Lauterpacht, International Law Commission, 1st
Report).
23. Terlinda v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902). See also C.C. HYDE, 1
INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED
STATES 566 (1922). Another definition of an extradition treaty is:
the surrender by ONE state to another of an individual who is found
within the territory of the former, and is accused of having committed a
crime within the territory of the latter; or who, having committed a crime
outside the territory of the latter, on one of it subjects, and as such, by
its law amenable to its jurisdiction.
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jurisdiction in which he or she is criminally charged or convicted,
the national is returned through an agreement of international law -
an extradition treaty.
The United States has recognized the importance of extradi-
tion treaties. The United States Supreme Court stated that
principles of international law recognize no right to extradition
apart from Treaty. While a government may, if agreeable to its
own constitution and laws, voluntarily exercise the power to
surrender a fugitive from justice to the country from which he
had fled, and it has been said that it is under a moral obligation
to do so ... the legal right to demand his extradition and the
correlative duty to surrender him to the demanding country
exists only when created by treaty.
24
Thus, the Court established that legal rights and obligations with
respect to extradition are valid "only when created by treaty."
Regardless of any moral obligation to return a fugitive, the Court
has acknowledged that the basis of the obligation is written
international law. Therefore, extradition treaties are the essence of
border relations between nations when a national charged with or
convicted of crimes leaves his or her home nation to escape
punishment or private or state actors kidnap a wanted suspect.
A. Canada - US Extradition Treaty
The original basis for extradition between Canada and the
United States is the extradition treaties drafted by the United
States and the United Kingdom (U.K.). 5  During the 1920's,
Canada and the United States extended the implications of the U.S.
- U.K. treaty through conventions.2 6 A written treaty, separate
from the U.S. - U.K. treaty, was drafted by the United States and
T. J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 258 (6th ed. 1915).
The Lawrence definition, unlike the Hyde definition, does not require any
evaluation of the requesting nation's competency to try the accused or convicted
national. Id. The competency of the requesting nation may include evaluating
such factors as judicial integrity, stability of government, and social structure. Id.
24. Factor v. Laubenhiemer, 290 U.S. 276, 276 (1933).
25. The first treaty enacted by the United States and the United Kingdom was
Boundaries, Slave Trade, Extradition (Webster-Ashburton Treaty), Aug. 9, 1842,
U.S.-U.K., art. X, 8 Stat. 572 [hereinafter 1842 Slave Trade Extradition Treaty].
26. The following conventions were held by the United Kingdom and the
United States during the 1920's : (1) Convention on the Suppression of Smuggling
Between the United States and Canada, June 6, 1924, U.S.-U.K., 44 Stat. 2097
[hereinafter 1924 Smuggling Convention]; and (2) Extradition: Narcotic Violations,
Jan. 8. 1925, U.S.-U.K., 44 Stat. 2100 [hereinafter 1925 Narcotics Treaty].
1995]
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Canada in 1974.27 The 1974 treaty was amended by the United
States and Canada in 1988.28
A historical survey of the extradition of fugitives between the
United States and the Canada reveals that the extradition treaty
based on the 1842 U.S. - U.K. model resolved problems centering
around the slave trade.29 Generally, fugitives who feared capture
as a result of conviction or questioning about illegal activities would
flee their home nation and simply cross the border into the
neighboring nation to escape.3 ° Both nations supported the end
of slavery; thus, the treaty effectively ordered the deliverance of
criminals involved in the slave trade.3'
Although crimes associated with the slave trade were not
extraditable until the 1889 Convention,32 the 1842 Treaty served
to suppress the slave trade indirectly and was used to prosecute
those involved with the slave trade.33 Further, the 1842 Treaty
recognized that the boundaries between the United States and
Canada were not clear. 4 However, despite the absence of specific
physical borders, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed
to work together in fighting crime by assuring the deliverance of
fugitives to the jurisdiction where they could be properly tried.
Thus, the United Kingdom effectuated a prompt delivery system
for persons committing crimes in its colony of Canada.
This general deliverance of fugitives was supplemented by a
later convention in 1889 between the United States and the United
Kingdom.35 This convention added to the list of extraditable
crimes already established by the treaty.36 It also prohibited the
27. Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983 [hereinafter
1971 Treaty on Extradition].
28. Protocol Amending the Treaty on Extradition between the United States
of America and Canada, Jan. 11, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 422 [hereinafter Extradition
Protocol].
29. 1842 Slave Trade Extradition Treaty, supra note 25.
30. Id.
31. The treaty defines a criminal as a person who was charged with murder,
assault wit the intent to commit murder, piracy, arson, robbery, or forgery. Id art.
X.
32. Id.
33. Extradition, July 12, 1889, U.S.-U.K., art. I, 26 Stat. 1508 [hereinafter 1889
Extradition Treaty].
34. 1842 Slave Trade Extradition Treaty, supra note 25.
35. Id.
36. Id. art. I. Pursuant to subsequent treaties, more offenses were added. In
1900, the following crimes were added to the list of extraditable offenses: .(1)
obtaining money, valuable securities, or other property by false pretenses; (2)
wilful and unlawful destruction or obstruction of railroads which endangers human
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extradition of a fugitive for political reasons," thus creating the
basis for political asylum. Following the extradition convention of
1889, the U.S. and Canada agreed to supplement the existing treaty
with conventions expanding the list of extraditable crimes.
3 8
The current extradition treaty between the United States and
Canada was enacted in 1971.39  Similar to the first U.S. - U.K.
treaty, the 1971 treaty established a goal of repressing crime in the
two nations by a reciprocal extradition of offenders.4 In fact, this
treaty replicates many of the articles already enacted in the U.S. -
U.K. extradition agreements relating to Canada.41 However, the
two treaties are not the same. Unlike the U.S. - U.K. treaties, the
U.S. - Canada extradition treaty addresses the predicament faced
when the requested extradition may ultimately result in capital
punishment.42 If the requesting nation may capitally punish the
suspect upon conviction, but the requested nation would not permit
capital punishment under such circumstances, extradition may be
denied unless guarantees assuring exception from capital punish-
ment are received. 3
A unique characteristic of the treaty is that the original
schedule of extraditable offenses contained in the 1971 extradition
treaty was replaced by the 1988 Protocol with a general provision
stating, "an offense is extraditable if punishable in both countries
life and (3) procuring abortion. Extradition, Dec. 13, 1900, U.S.-U.K., art. I, 32
Stat. 1864. In 1905, the following crimes were added to the list of extraditable
offenses: (1) bribery as defined by both nations and (2) any shared criminal
bankruptcy laws. Extradition, Apr. 12, 1905, U.S.-U.K., art. I, 34 Stat. 2903. In
1922, the following crime was added to the list of extraditable offenses: wilful
desertion or wilful non-support of minor or dependent children. Extradition:
Canada, May 15, 1922, U.S.-U.K., art. I, 42 Stat. 2224.
37. 1889 Extradition Treaty, supra note 33, art. II.
38. In 1908, an extradition treaty concerning criminal wrecking and salvage
was signed. Extradition: Wrecking and Salvage (Canada), May 18, 1908, U.S.-
U.K., 35 Stat. 2035. Sixteen years later, a convention was agreed upon to suppress
smuggling. 1924 Smuggling Convention, supra note 26. A special convention was
signed in 1925 regarding extradition of fugitives who were charged with or
convicted of narcotics violations. 1925 Narcotics Treaty, supra note 26.
39. The first treaty, between the United States and Canada, separate from
those of the United States and the United Kingdom was enacted in 1951.
Extradition: A Proclamation, Oct. 26, 1951, U.S.-Can., 3 U.S.T. 2826. The current
treaty in force is the 1971 treaty. 1971 Treaty on Extradition, supra note 27.
40. 1971 Treaty on Extradition, supra note 27.
41. Id. art. VI. There has been much discussion on the death penalty
extradition cases. See John Pak, Canadian Extradition and the Death Penalty:
Seeking a Constitutional Assurance of Life, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 239 (1993).
42. 1971 Treaty on Extradition, supra note 27, art. VI.
43. Id.
1995]
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by more than one year's imprisonment."'  This statement expands
the classes of extraditable offenses originally available in the 1971
treaty.45 Additionally, the 1988 Protocol also expresses a special
disapproval of bounty hunters.
46
Thus, the U.S. - Canadian extradition treaty now in force is
rooted in U.S. - U.K. relations. This root is grounded in fairness
and justice. Further, the original extradition agreement entered
into focused on the slave trade. The approach to curtailing the
crime of slave trading was not to directly arrest those caught
trading, but to extradite those persons who were committing
ancillary crimes so justice could be served.
After the border between the United States and Canada
became more definite, amendments were made to the U.S. - U.K.
extradition provisions. Eventually, the United States and Canada
identified a need to repress crime through a challenging extradition
treaty. This treaty expanded the class of extraditable offenses to
crimes punishable in both countries by more than one year's
imprisonment.47 The U.S. - Canadian extradition treaty indicates
that transborder fugitives are a major concern and crime will be
controlled by sending suspects back to their home nation to either
be tried or to serve their sentences.
B. Canada - U.S. Extradition Cases
Numerous cases exist where Americans fled the United States
and entered Canada in order to escape either conviction or serving
criminal sentences.48 The Canadian courts have dealt with U.S.
fugitives charged with or convicted of fraud,49 drug violations,50
44. Extradition Protocol, supra note 28, at 423.
45. However, a very small number of additional extraditable offenses, such as
mail fraud affecting interstate or foreign commerce, crimes of taxation, revenue
or of a fiscal nature, and parental kidnapping were specifically included. Id. (i).
46. The United States made a special commitment to stop civilian bounty
hunters from kidnapping Canadians charged with or convicted of crimes in
Canada. Marian Nash Leich, U.S. Practice: Extradition, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 336,
336 (1988). In a letter exchanged between U.S. Secretary of State Schultz and
Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs Clark, the United States
committed itself to commence extradition proceedings, pursuant to the 1971 Treaty
on Extradition, supra note 27, against a defendant who has been brought into the
United States by bounty hunters. Il at 339.
47. 1971 Treaty on Extradition, supra note 27.
48. Baker, supra note 3.
49. Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice), (1992), [1993], 97 D.L.R.4th 577,
77 C.C.C.3d 65 (corporate financial fraud); United States of America v. St. Galeis
(1994), [1994] 90 C.C.C.3d 83 (wire fraud); McVey v. United States (1992), [1993]
97 D.L.R.4th 193, 77 C.C.C.3d 1 (mail fraud).
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and murder.51 If the treaty procedure is followed, most fugitives
are returned to the United States. However, in recent years, the
Canadian courts have debated whether extradition of particular
fugitives52 would violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (hereinafter "the Charter").
53
Canadian extradition procedures are judicially reviewable
executive determinations.' In particular, "a court must firmly
keep in mind that it is in the Executive that the discretion to
surrender a fugitive is vested.., consequently, barring obvious or
urgent circumstances, the Executive should not be pre-empted.
55
The court views itself as taking a very limited role in executive
decisions concerning extradition.56
Canadian judicial review of extradition cases is limited because
the judiciary adheres to the tenet that relations between nations are
political in character and are best left to the executive actors.57
Additionally, the text of the Canadian Charter limits its extraterri-
torial application to matters over which the Parliament has
authority over.58 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Canada has
50. Jamieson, supra note 2.
51. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) (1991), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858, 67
C.C.C.3d 1 (fled to Canada after being convicted of first degree murder,
conspiracy to commit murder, and kidnapping in U.S.); Ng v. Canada (Minister of
Justice) (1991), [1992] 67 C.C.C.3d 61 (U.S. sought for extradition on charges of
murder, kidnapping, conspiracy to commit murder, accessory after a murder,
conspiracy to kidnap, and burglary where defendant asked Canadian ministry to
seek assurances that death penalty would not be imposed).
52. Arg. v. Mellino (1987), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536, 33 C.C.C.3d 334, 353 (fled to
Canada after being charged for wife's murder in Argentina).
53. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Sched. B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter The
Charter.] In most extradition cases, the "Legal Rights" Section of the Charter is
challenged. See Kindler, supra note 51. In particular § 7 and § 12 are sources of
the debate. The Charter, §§ 7, 12. Section 7 states that "everyone has the right
to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Id Section 12
states that "everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment." Id.
54. Idziak, supra note 49, 77 C.C.C.3d at 471.
55. Mellino, supra note 52, 33 C.C.C.3d at 353.
56. Schmidt v. The Queen (1987), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 33 C.C.C.3d 193, 212.
57. Courts have generally been cautious in their application of The Charter to
extradition proceedings. Id. Specifically, although a case by case analysis may
seem just, treaties should be interpreted with judicial restraint in order to ensure
the fulfillment of international obligations. Id.
58. The Charter, supra note 53. Section 32 of the Charter states
(1) This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of
Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament
including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest
1995]
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declared that a court of competent jurisdiction may "conclude that
the surrender of an individual constitutes a violation of the
Charter."59 Indeed, the Canadian judiciary has stated that it will
continue to review extradition cases, although review will be
restrictive.' °
Two of the most publicly criticized decisions of the Canadian
courts concerned the extradition of two Americans facing the death
penalty in the United States if convicted.61 Canadian law does not
permit the death penalty because it violates sections 762 and 12 
6
of the Charter prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment.'
According to the U.S. - Canada extradition treaty, the Canadian
executive may require assurances that the death penalty will not be
imposed upon a fugitive returned to the United States. 6 Howev-
er, because extradition proceedings are not criminal proceedings,
these assurances are not guarantees.66 Therefore, a fugitive is not
denied his fundamental rights if the Canadian minister fails to seek
assurances that the accused or convicted fugitive will not receive
capital punishment upon return to the United States.67 In an
interesting turn of events, the Canadian judiciary started to refuse
to extradite fugitives subject to the minimum sentencing laws if
imposition of minimum sentences would violate the Charter.'
In September 1994, a Canadian appellate court refused to
extradite a U.S. fugitive who was eligible to receive a twenty year
minimum sentence upon return to the United States. 69 In United
States v. Jamieson,7° the appellate court stated that extraditing
Jamieson would violate section 7 of the Charter.71 The Court
Territories; and (2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), section 15 shall not
have effect until three years after this section comes into force. Id.
Therefore, as (1) states, only Parliament and the government of Canada must
abide by the conditions stated in the Charter. Id.
59. Schmidt, supra note 56, 33 C.C.C.3d at 212-16.
60. See generally Jamieson, supra note 2.
61. Kindler, supra note 51.
62. The Charter, supra note 53.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 1971 Treaty on Extradition, supra note. 27, art. VI.
66. Kindler, supra note 51, 67 C.C.C.3d at 2.
67. Id.
68. Swardson, supra note 1.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Baker, supra note 3. Jamieson was charged with selling 273 grams of
cocaine for $20,000 to an undercover officer. Mike Martindale, Canada Calls
Michigan Law 'Cruel'; Won't Extradite Man, Gannett News Serv., Sept. 6, 1994,
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concluded that Jamieson would face cruel and unusual punishment
violating his human rights if he served Michigan's twenty year
minimum sentence for his alleged crime of selling 273 grams of
cocaine.72 If Jamieson was convicted of the same offense in
Canada, he would likely serve 5 years in jail.73
The Jamieson case is original.74 For the first time, a Canadian
appellate judge overruled a ministerial decision to extradite a U.S.
fugitive for reasons of punishment.75 Previously, when U.S.
fugitives who were charged with crimes or convicted of capital
crimes escaped, they secured only a temporary haven in Canada
and eventually were extradited.76 However, the Canadian judge
stated, "it is my view that a majority of ... reasonably well-
informed Canadians would consider that appellant faces a situation
in Michigan that shocks the conscience and is simply unaccept-
able., 77 The judge concluded that sending Jamieson back to the
United States to face a twenty year minimum sentence without an
opportunity for parole would "offend the Canadian sense of what
is fair, right, and just.
78
When a Canadian court determines whether an American or
any other national should be extradited, the reviewing court must
consider the offence for which the penalty may be prescribed, as
well as the nature of the justice system in the requesting jurisdic-
tion and the safeguards and guarantees it affords the fugitive.79
In reaching a decision, the judge may consider the amount of time
the fugitive would serve if convicted in Canada as opposed to the
available in LEXIS, News Library, INT'L File. Prior to his trial in the United
States, Jamieson fled to Canada. Id. Once Jamieson entered Canada he acquired
an alias and began working at a Montreal restaurant. Id. About five years after
his initial entry into Canada, Jamieson was arrested by U.S. drug enforcement
agents aided by Canadian police. Id.
72. Morning Edition: Canada won't extradite drug trafficker to U.S., Sept. 21,
1994, (NPR radio broadcast 6:00am ET) (transcript #1438-6) available in LEXIS,
News Library, SCRIPT File [hereinafter Morning Edition].
73. Swardson, supra note 1.
74. Id.
75. However, the decision has been appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court.
The Canadian Supreme Court has not yet decided whether or not it will hear the
case. Canadian Court Refuses to Extradite Michigan Drug Suspect, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 14, 1994, at 25.
76. Id.
77. Swardson, supra note 1.
78. Id.
79. Baker, supra note 3. This standard is based upon the criteria established
in the Kindler case. See Kindler, supra note 51, at 67 C.C.C.3d at 2.
1995]
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country requesting extradition." Because Jamieson would serve
a mere five years in Canada for this offense, the judge felt had to
intervene because to do otherwise would violate the Canadian
constitution.81
Nonetheless, some commentators and Canadian citizens
criticized the court's refusal to extradite the fugitive.' Some
believed that Canada should not interfere in the U.S. justice system
by encouraging fugitives to enter Canada in search of safe ha-
vens.83 Others contended that the cost of keeping Jamieson was
an unreasonable expense and a waste of Canadian taxpayers' mon-
ey.84 Still other Canadians argued that the Canadian legal system
should not pass judgment on U.S. law, in particular, mandatory
sentencing laws intended to fight an epidemic problem of drug
crimes. 1 Indeed, it appears that the appellate court, by refusing
to extradite Jamieson, passed judgment on the U.S. legal system by
declaring that the Michigan twenty year minimum sentencing law
at issue was unreasonable and fundamentally unfair.86
Even if the Canadian Supreme Court reviews this case and
eventually extradites Mr. Jamieson, there will be cases in the future
requiring appellate courts to evaluate U.S. laws.' Future cases
could lead to substantial amounts of litigation, resulting in high
costs for the Canadian legal system and a general dissatisfaction
among the Canadian populous." However, under the current
80. Id. at 3.
81. Swardson, supra note 1.
82. For example, see Kathi Stewart Boucher, Canada Shouldn't Interfere in
American Justice, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 2, 1994, at A10.
83. Id.
84. Steve Sullivan, Unacceptable Ruling, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 2,1994,
at A10.
85. Justice Begins at Home, THE OTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 4, 1994, at A10.
86. Id.
87. Canadian courts must follow their own constitution and other treaty
obligations. See Ng, supra note 51, 67 C.C.C.3d at 65. The U.N. Human Rights
Committee found that Canada violated its obligations under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in failing to protect against the imposition
of the death penalty. Laurie Watson, Extradition Decision Lets Canadian
Government Off Hook, Jan. 26, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ARCNEWs File.
88. There have been numerous editorials and opinions concerning the
extradition of Jamieson in Canadian newspapers. See Boucher, supra note 82;
Justice Begins At Home, supra note 85, at A10. In general, these editorials
criticize the Canadian judiciary's interference with a Michigan minimum sentencing
law. The editorials also comment on the cost to the Canadian legal system
resulting from the Jamieson case. Sullivan, supra note 84. Litigation of the case
has already cost $280,000. Id. Finally, the articles reprimand the Canadian
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extradition treaty, Canada reserves the right to refuse extradition
of fugitives if extradition would violate the Canadian sense of what
is fair and just while bearing in mind the nature of the offense, the
potential penalty, the foreign justice system, and the discretion that
should be given to the Canadian judiciary.89 Therefore, extradi-
tion from Canada requires the Canadian judiciary to judge the
requesting nation's laws to assure that the fugitive will not face
treatment that is unconstitutional under the Charter.9°
Although the Jamieson case is the first of its kind, there have
been subsequent related cases. In September of 1994, the Canadi-
an courts were faced with the extradition of another American
charged with a drug offense.91 Salvatore Cazzetta was arrested in
May, 1994 in Florida for drug trafficking.' Prior to his trial,
Cazzetta, like Jamieson, fled to Canada.93 The Superior Court of
Montreal decided to extradite Cazzetta to the United States.
94
However, Cazzetta is appealing this decision by arguing that he has
a right to be heard in Canada. 95 Cazzetta is hoping his extradition
will be overturned on the same basis as Jamieson S.96
The Canadian extradition cases recognize a sense of justice and
fairness in international relationships. The Canadian judiciary,
although directed by its legislature to rarely overrule executive
decisions concerning extradition, feels obliged to adhere to the
tenets of its Constitution which provides for freedom from cruel
and unusual punishment in the issuance of minimum sentences and
death penalties.'
C. Mexico - US. Extradition Treaty
The United States and Mexico first entered into an extradition
treaty in 1899.98 The two nations decided to "deliver up" fugitives
judiciary for creating a safe haven for fugitives. Canada Should Return Fugitive,
THE GAZETrE (Montreal), Aug. 30, 1994, at B2.
89. Kindler, supra note 51, at 67 C.C.C.3d at 3.
90. Id.
91. Geoff Baker, Judge Orders Gang Leaders Extradited on Cocaine Charges,





96. Baker, supra note 91.
97. Kindler, supra note 51, 67 C.C.C.3d at 31-42.
98. Extradition, Feb. 22, 1899, U.S.-Mex., 31 Stat. 1818 [hereinafter 1899
Extradition Treaty].
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in order to better administer justice and prevent crime." There-
fore, a fugitive who was charged with or convicted of a crime
enumerated in the treaty within the jurisdiction of either the
United States or Mexico had to be returned to the requesting
nation."° Twenty-one extraditable offenses were included in the
1899 Treaty."' The treaty also specified when extradition could
not take place.1" As with other international agreements, articles
IV and VIII of the treaty required the Executive to issue extradi-
tion decisions and required diplomatic agents, such as executive
agents, to administer the details of the extradition including the
production of the warrant and other necessary papers.'0 3 Extradi-
tion to third-party nations was also anticipated and denied."°
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. The treaty lists the following crimes as extraditable: (1) murder; (2) rape;
(3) bigamy; (4) arson; (5) crimes committed at sea; (6) burglary; (7) breaking and
entering into government or financial offices; (8) robbery; (9) forgery; (10) forgery
of public documents; (11) counterfeiting; (12) introduction of instruments used for
counterfeiting; (13) embezzlement of public funds; (14) embezzlement of bank
funds; (15) embezzlement of employer's funds by employee; (16) kidnapping of
minors or adults; (17) mayhem or mutilation causing disability or death; (18)
malicious and unlawful destruction of public means of transportation, public offices
and private dwellings when the act committed endangers human life; (19) the
crime of obtaining by threat or false pretenses money, valuables or other personal
property, if such a crime is punishable under the laws of both nations; (20) larceny;
and (21) all offenses which are punishable as a felony in both nations. Id art. II.
102. Pursuant to the treaty, extradition shall not take place in any of the
following circumstances: (1) if the requested nation's law would not find sufficient
evidence for apprehension and commitment for trial; (2) if the crime is one of a
purely political nature; (3) if the statute of limitations in the requested nations has
expired; or (4) if the fugitive has been tried and either convicted or -acquitted in
the requested nation. Id. art. III.
103. 1899 Extradition Treaty, supra note 98, art. IV.
104. Mexico and the United States anticipated the implications of an extradition
treaty and provided that third parties could not request the extradition of a
fugitive. Id. art. XII. Article XII reads:
A person surrendered under this convention shall not be tried or
punished in the country to which his of her extradition has been granted,
nor given up to a third power, for a crime or offense not provided for by
this convention and committed previous to his or her extradition, unless
the consent of the surrendering government be given for such trial or
such surrender to a third power. hd
However, according to article XVI, if another convention of extradition between
a third party and either Mexico or the United States is in effect, the fugitive could
be extradited to a third-party nation. Id art. XVI. Article XVI reads:
A person surrendered to or delivered up by either of the contracting
parties by virtue of a convention of extradition with a third party and not
being a citizen of the country of transit, may be conveyed in transit
across the territory of the other, of the convenient course of travel from
or to the country to which he has been surrendered shall lie in whole or
1 NAFTA EXTRADITION TREATY
Following a convention in 1902 to amend the treaty,1°5 a
second agreement was signed in 1925.1°6 Furthermore, in 1939,
the bilateral agreement was expanded in scope to include accesso-
ries to any crimes previously listed as extraditable." 7
part within such territory.
The contracting party delivering up or receiving such surrendered
person shall make application for such purpose to the government of the
country through which transit is desired, producing in support of such
application a duly attested copy of the warrant of surrender issued by the
government granting the extradition; and thereupon, the proper executive
authority of the country whose territory is to be so traversed may issue
a warrant permitting the transit of the surrendered person transported.
Such transit must be wholly accomplished within thirty days, counting
from the date of the entrance of such transported person within the
territory of the country of transit, after which time said person may be
set at liberty if there found. Id.
Thus, assume that a Canadian fugitive fled to the United States and then to
Mexico. According to the first extradition treaty between the United State and
Mexico, the Canadian government could petition the United States government
to request Mexico to extradite the fugitive to the United States. The United
States, according to its extradition treaty with Canada, could then extradite the
fugitive to Canada.
105. Approximately three years after signing the treaty, the United States and
Mexico added the crime of bribery to the list of extraditable offenses covered by
the treaty. Extradition, June 25, 1902, U.S.-Mex., T.S. 421.
. 106. The crimes of trafficking and using narcotic drugs, the manufacturing of
or traffic in substances injurious to health or poisonous chemicals, and smuggling
were added to the list of extraditable crimes. Extradition, Dec. 23, 1925, U.S.-
Mex., 44 Stat. 2409 [hereinafter 1925 Extradition Treaty]. Obviously, the U.S. -
Mexican border is the perfect door for the drug trade because a criminal could
trade drugs in one nation and then escape by crossing the border. For a current
critique of this problem, see Miriam Mercado, Central America is Gateway to
Drugs for United States, Notimex American News Serv., available in LEXIS, News
Library, NON-U.S. File. For example, criminals could produce drugs in Mexico
and simply bring the drugs into the United States to sell. Upon sale, the criminal
would disappear in Mexico. Because no crime had been committed in Mexico, the
criminal would not be a concern to the Mexican police. The 1925 Convention
attempted to remedy this problem by requiring the Mexican police to return any
person to the United States who had violated a drug law, including the trafficking
of chemicals hazardous to a human's health. 1925 Extradition Treaty, art. I.
Under the 1925 Convention, violations of customs laws were added to the list of
extraditable offenses. Id. Thus, by 1925 the list of extraditable offenses totaled
25. Id. at art. II.
107. Another offense designated in the Supplementary Extradition Convention
states that "extradition shall also take place for participation in any of the crimes
before referred to as an accessory before or after the fact; provided such participa-
tion be punishable by the laws of both the High Contracting Parties." Extradition
Convention, U.S.-Mex., Aug. 16, 1939, art. I, 55 Stat. 1133.
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In 1978, the U.S. and Mexico signed a completely revised
extradition treaty which is still in force today.1" One of the goals
of the new proclamation was to further the fight against crime and
establish better procedures for extradition."° The first article of
the treaty creates a mutual obligation to extradite persons who
have committed a crime in either the U.S. or Mexico."' Further,
the U.S. and Mexico are required to extradite a national who
commits a crime outside the territory of the requesting party if
either of two situations exist."'
Under the first situation, if the harboring nation's laws would
punish the fugitive in similar circumstances, then extradition must
be granted."' Further, in the second situation, the nation must
extradite the fugitive if the fugitive is a national of the. requesting
nation, and the requesting nation has jurisdiction to try this fugitive
under its own law.113 This obligation to extradite creates a large
class of extraditable persons who have committed crimes outside
the jurisdiction of either country who have then fled to Mexico or
the United States.
The second article sets up the schedule of extraditable offens-
es"1 listed in an appendix 15 to the treaty. However, the list of
crimes included in the Appendix is not exhaustive."6 The second
article permits extradition for wilful acts punishable by more than
one year of imprisonment.11 7 Also, extradition must be granted
108. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and The United
Mexican States, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T 5059 [hereinafter U.S.-Mex.
Extradition Treaty.]
109. Id.
110. Id. art. I.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. U.S.-Mex. Extradition Treaty, supra note 108.
114. Id. art. 2.
115. Id. app.
116. Extraditable crimes include those that fall into the categories of crimes
listed in the Appendix. Id. art. 2. Therefore, the list does not appear to be
exhaustive and includes related crimes within the category of extraditable offenses.
If the fugitive has already been convicted and served part of his jail term, the
remaining jail time must be for at least more than six months. Id. The reason for
this minimum requirement is likely that extradition is a long, expensive process.
Consequently, by the time a fugitive's extradition is requested and reviewed, much
of the six months of jail time will have expired.
117. This clause states "extradition shall also be granted for wilful acts which,
although not being included in the Appendix, are punishable, in accordance with
the federal laws of both Contracting Parties, by a deprivation of liberty the
maximum of which shall not less than one year." U.S.-Mex. Extradition Treaty,
supra note 108, art. 2. The language in the clause indicates that in order for the
NAFTA EXTRADITION TREATY
for attempting or conspiring to execute or participating in execution
of an offense listed in the Appendix."' In addition, the treaty
addresses the issue of jurisdiction and permits the United States to
have overreaching powers.'19
The United States and Mexico have agreed to prohibit extradi-
tion of fugitives involved in political or military offenses. 20 This
prohibition is based on the concept of refuge which allows
nationals to search for refuge where nations share common physical
borders.12 1 Nonetheless, some offenses have been deemed
unworthy of such an exception."
The controversial issue of capital punishment is included in the
1978 extradition treaty." Article 8 of the Treaty does not
mandate extradition of a fugitive who faces the death penalty if he
is or has been convicted. 24 Thus, the harboring nation will view
extradition with discretion if it does not allow for the death penalty
for particular offenses."2
If the requesting state, the nation where the fugitive is hiding,
permits the death penalty for the charged offense, the treaty must
be enforced and the fugitive must be extradited. 26 In the alter-
offense to be extraditable, both nations must attach a penalty of at least one year
jail time if a conviction resulted. Id.
118. Id.
119. If an issue of jurisdiction arises, specifically that the United States
government may not have the long-arm ability to reach a particular fugitive,
transportation of persons or the use of mail or other means of interstate and
foreign commerce will suffice to create an element of the offense. Id. art. 2. Once
this element has been included, the United States will have jurisdiction over the
fugitive, as it is likely that the fugitive fled through the United States or used the
mail or interstate or foreign commerce to leave the United States. Once
jurisdiction has been established, the Treaty applies in full force. U.S.-Mex.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 108, art. 2.
120. Pursuant to article 5 of the treaty, political and military offenses are not
be extraditable. Il art. 5. However, the determination of what constitutes such
an offense is left to the authority of the Executive of the requested party. Id
121. Id.
122. Id. art. 2. The offenses which are excluded from the political and military
exceptions are:
a) The murder or other wilful crime against the life or physical integrity
of a Head of State, of Head of Government or his family, including
attempts to commit such an offense.
b) An offense which the Contracting Party [the United States or Mexico]
may have the obligation to prosecute by reason of a multilateral interna-
tional agreement.
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native, if the requested party does not permit capital punishment
for that particular crime, the requesting nation may make assuranc-
es that the death penalty will not be imposed and the fugitive must
then be extradited.
127
Some situations exist which do not require the extradition of
a fugitive. If the fugitive is a national of the requested party, the
requested nation is not bound to extradite."2  However, the
Executive of the requested nation may, in its discretion, deliver the
national for extradition. 129 Nonetheless, if the Executive does not
extradite the fugitive, the requested nation must prosecute the
fugitive if it has proper jurisdiction. 131 Obviously, the effective-
ness of this clause is not clear. Indeed, Mexico has never acceded
to a U.S. request for extradition of a Mexican national. 3 '
Most recently, Mexico refused to extradite Serapio Zoniga-
Rios for prosecution in the brutal rape of a four year old American
child.1 32 Further, there are reports that the Mexican legal system
is corrupt.1 33 For example, a Mexican lawyer reported that after
inquiring about a client at a Mexican police station, the police
searched his home, terrorized his friends and family, and forced the
lawyer to submit a forced confession all without probable
cause."3  Even the Mexican electoral system is plagued with
accusations of coercion by government officials and union agen-
cies. 13  Ultimately, these reports of corruption will lead to a
congressional hearing on the rampant bribery and corruption of
Mexican officials. 36 Therefore, it is possible that the extradition
treaty is not completely effective in suppressing crime because the
Mexican national who is not extradited may face inappropriate
sanctioning.
127. Id.
128. U.S.-Mex. Extradition Treaty, supra note 108, art. 9.
129. Id. art. 9(1).
130. Id. art. 9(2).
131. Jimmy Gurule, Think Twice on Extradition Treaty, CHI. TRIB., June 27,
1994, at 13.
132. Id.
133. Christopher Whalen, Bordering on Repression: We Shouldn't Trade Freely
with Mexico Until It Cleans Up Its Act, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1992, at C3.
134. Les Whittington, Torture and Free Trade: Mexico, which could soon have
closer ties to Canada through free trade, continues to be a country where almost
anyone who arrested runs the risk of police torture, THE VANCOUVER SUN, Nov.
9, 1991, at B6.
135. More Democracy Needed in Mexico; Reforms are positive but killings and
impunity persist, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Aug. 24, 1994, at B2.
136. Diane Francis, Mexican Bribery Case May Hurt NAFTA: Allegations over
bidding process raise concerns for business, THE FIN. POST, Oct. 27, 1993, at 13.
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The United States and Mexico realized that extradition of
criminals could be more effective if the two nations agreed to
mutually assist in the investigation of crimes and the capture of
criminals.'37 Thus, in 1988, the U.S. and Mexico signed the
Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty (hereinafter "Mutual
Assistance Treaty").'38  This treaty calls for cooperation in
criminal matters including: (1) the taking of testimony or state-
ments of witnesses; 139 (2) the provision of documents, records,
and evidence;'° (3) the execution of requests for searches and
seizures; 4' (4) the serving of documents; 42 and (5) the assis-
tance with immobilizing, securing, and forfeiture of the proceeds,
fruits, and instrumentalities of crime.43 In addition to the imple-
mentation of the Mutual Assistance Treaty, the United States and
137. Mexico - United States: Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty, Dec.
9, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 443 (1988) [hereinafter Mutual Assistance Treaty].
138. Id. at 447. The treaty aspires to provide assistance in the "prevention,
investigation and prosecution of crimes" and in other criminal and ancillary
proceedings arising from the criminal acts in question. Id. Therefore, the treaty
facilitates easier investigation and processing after formal charges have been filed.
Id.
139. Pursuant to article 5 of the Mutual Assistance Treaty, the requested nation
must pay all costs relating to.(1) the execution of the request forwitnesses except
for the lawful fees of witnesses and expert witnesses and (2) travel costs incurred
by witnesses. Id. art. 5. Article 7 states that a subpoena must compel the
testimony of a witness. I& art. '7. Also, article 8 requires that the witness,
although subpoenaed to appear, consent to testifying in the extradition proceeding.
Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 137, art. 8. These provisions indicate that
the production of witnesses will be facilitate by the terms of the treaty. Id.
140. Id. at 449-50. Article 10 of the Mutual Assistance Treaty requires the
harboring nation to provide the requesting party with available public records of
government departments and agencies. Id. Furthermore, if the documents are
not publicly available, but are available to law enforcement officers or judicial
authorities, the documents must be provided to the requesting party as long as no
legal prohibitions exist. Id.
141. Upon the requesting party's inquiry, article 12 of the Mutual Assistance
Treaty permits the requested party to execute a search or seizure pursuant to its
own laws. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 137. Once a search has been
completed, its fruits may be admissible at trial upon certification by the party who
actually conducted the search. Id. at 447.
142. Article 14 of the Mutual Assistance Treaty requires the requested nation
to serve a party upon the showing of cause by the requesting nation. Id. at 451.
143. Article 11 of the Mutual Assistance Treaty allows a party to notify the
other party when it has reason to believe that proceeds, fruits or instrumentalities
of crime are located within its territory. Id. at 450. Additionally, the two parties
will assist one another in immobilizing, securing, and collecting the proceeds, fruits,
and instrumentalities of crime, restitution and fines. Mutual Assistance Treaty,
supra note 137, at 450.
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Mexico revised their 1978 extradition treaty with an accord in
1994. 44 The accord prohibits cross-border kidnapping of criminal
suspects wanted for prosecution in either the U.S. or Mexico.145
Although the accord still must be ratified by official lawmakers in
both nations, it signifies a reestablished movement towards
cooperation in extradition.1"
Thus, the United States and Mexico can not deny that crime
is a problem along the stretch of border that the two nations
share.147  Criminals will probably continue to find that crossing
over a nation's border is the easiest way to escape prosecution.
However, the United States and Mexico have gone beyond the
formal requirements of extradition by combining their law
enforcement efforts to suppress crime.
D. Mexico - US. Extradition Cases
Generally, the United States and Mexico have faced problems
with the extradition treaty of Mexican nationals from Mexico."
The most recent case, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, involved
the abduction by U.S. agents of a Mexican doctor who supposedly
was involved in the murder of a U.S. federal drug enforcement
agent. 149 The United States Supreme Court concluded that the
national's abduction from Mexico was not a violation of the Mexico
- U.S. extradition treaty1
5°
144. New U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty Bars Cross Border Kidnappings,
ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Nov. 24, 1994, at 2A.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Mercado, supra note 106. See also Unique Opportunity U.S.-Mexico
Should on Drug Trafficking, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Mar. 13, 1994, at G2
(Mexico and U.S. began implementation of a joint task forces to combat drug
trafficking over the border).
148. It is likely that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain,
supra note 4, may displace remaining effects of the Mutual Assistance Treaty. In
Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national was abducted by United States government
authorities. Id. at 657. Although the Court admonished the U.S. government's
actions, it concluded that the terms of the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty did not
prohibit the Mexican national's abduction. Id. at 669.
149. The Mexican national was charged with conspiracy to commit violent acts
in furtherance of racketeering acts, violation of racketeering acts, conspiracy to
kidnap a federal agent, kidnapping of a federal agent, and felony murder of a
federal agent. Id. at 657.
150. Id. at 669-70. Many commentaries have criticized the Supreme Court's
ruling in Alvarez-Machain. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, After Alvarez-Machain:
Abduction, Standing, Denials of Justice, and Unaddressed Human Rights Claims,
67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 551 (1993); Stephanie A. Re, "The Treaty Doesn't Say We
Can't Kidnap Anyone"-Government Sponsored Kidnapping as a Means of
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The Court analyzed the extradition treaty in terms of its
express language. 151  The Court initially acknowledged that
Article 9 of the Mexico - U.S. extradition treaty states that neither
Mexico nor the United States is obligated to deliver its own
nationals to the other nation for prosecution."5 2 However, the
treaty does not prohibit abduction of a national in order to
prosecute.53 Because the extradition treaty does not prohibit the
abduction of an accused criminal, U.S. courts are not precluded
from obtaining personal jurisdiction by this means.
The Court thus applied its long-standing Ker15 - Frisbie155
Circumventing Extradition Treaties, 44 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 265
(1993); Hernan de J. Ruiz-Bravo, Monstrous Decision: Kidnapping is Legal, 20
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833 (1993); Aaron Schwabach & S.A. Patchett, Doctrine
or Dictum: the Ker-Frisbie-Alvarez Doctrine and Official Abductions Which Breach
International Law, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 19 (1993); Royal J. Stark, The
Ker-Frisbie-Alvarez Doctrine: International Law, Due Process and United States
Sponsored Kidnapping of Foreign Officials Abroad, 9 CONN. J. INT. L. 113 (1993);
Fernando R. Teson, International Abductions, Low-intensity Conflicts and State
Sovereignty: A Moral Inquiry, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 551 (1994); Bad
Precedent, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 18, 1992, at 20; Kidnap? Sure, Says the
Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1992, at 26; Latin America: Unanimous Criticism of
U.S. Supreme Court Decision, Inter Press Serv., June 17, 1992, available in LEXIS,
News Library, ALLNEWS File; David Lauter, Mexican Leader Scolds Quayle Over
Abduction, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990, at IA; Herman Schwartz, The Supreme
Court's Insult to Law-Abiding Countries Law: By Allowing the U.S. to Kidnap
Foreign Citizens in Another Country, the Justices Make a Mockery of Much of
What We Preach, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1992, at M.
151. Alvarez-Machain, supra note 4, at 663-64.
152. Id. at 663.
153. Id. at 666. Abduction may violate customary international law. Harvard
Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp.) 435 (1935)
[hereinafter Harvard Convention]. Article 6 of the Harvard Convention states:
Apprehension in Violation of International Law. In exercising
jurisdiction under this convention, no state shall prosecute or punish any
person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to its
authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law or
international convention, without first obtaining the consent of the state
or states whose rights have been violated by such measures. Id. at 623.
Thus, abduction was not expressly prohibited by the extradition treaty because it
is probably illegal according to international law.
154. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Ker was forcibly abducted from Peru
in order to stand trial in Illinois for charges of larceny. Id. The U.S. Supreme
Court concluded that even though Ker's presence before the Illinois tribunal was
secured without reliance on the extradition treaty negotiated between the U.S. and
Peru, the Illinois tribunal had proper jurisdiction. Id. at 444. Although the
method of securing Ker's presence may have been morally reprehensible, it would
not prohibit his prosecution. Id.
155. Frisbie v. Coffins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Frisbie, while in Chicago, was
kidnapped by Michigan authorities and brought to trial in Michigan. Id. at 522.
The court applied its rule in Ker and concluded that a defendant can not escape
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Rule. This Rule states that the power of a court to try a person for
a crime is not impaired by reason of a forcible abduction.156 The
Court held that the abduction of a Mexican national with the aid
of or by the direction of the U.S. government does not preclude the
U.S. courts from prosecution due to lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. 157  Therefore, where the United States and Mexico have
attempted to extradite a national from his own nation 15 8 pursuant
to article 9,159 and the extradition treaty has not, provided a
solution, a government may turn to forcible abduction."6
The dissenting justices in Alavarez-Machain suggested that
international law had been violated. International law prohibits
securing personal jurisdiction by abduction of the suspect.
161
Nonetheless, the Court's opinion concluded that the extradition
treaty between the United States and Mexico was not violated
because an executive police power was exercised. 162  According
to the majority, then, it follows that international law was not
violated.16'
In order to supplement its reasoning, the Court discussed the
purpose of the U.S. - Mexico extradition treaty-" The Court
stated that in the absence of an extradition treaty, nations are
under no obligation to surrender persons to foreign authorities for
justice simply because he was forcibly brought before a tribunal. Id.
156. Alvarez-Machain, supra note 4, at 665.
157. Id. at 662-70. The court applies its Ker-Frisbie rule, regardless of the
identity of the abductors. Id. at 662-63.
158. It is speculated that the United States Department of State and the
Government of Mexico exchanged notes prior to the abduction. Keith Highet, et
al., International Decisions: United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
811, 811 (1992). Thus, it may be assumed that a deal for Alvarez-Machain's
extradition was attempted. Id.
159. Alvarez-Machain, see supra notes 4, 148 and 149 and accompanying text.
160. Abduction is referred to as informal extradition. GERHARD VON GLAHN,
LAW AMONG NATIONS 267-69 (1976). A great variety of devices and practices are
utilized by a state to apprehend civil, criminal and political offenders. Id. These
practices and devices do not follow the details and characteristics of normal
practice pursuant to an extradition treaty. Id. After forcible abductions have
taken place, some nations (the United States in particular) do not return the
defendant to the nation from which he was abducted. Id. Formal apologies may,
however, be sent from the abducting state to the abductee's home state. See
Helen Silving, In Re Eichman: A Dilemma of Law and Morality, 55 AM. J. INT'L
L. 307-58 (1961) for an example of an apology resulting from an abduction case
in the case of Adolf Eichmann who was abducted by some private citizens in
Argentina and taken to Israel.
161. Alvarez-Machain, supra note 4, at 670-88.
162. Id. at 669.
163. Id. at 667-70.
164. Id. at 659.
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prosecution. 'o Therefore, if nations mutually agree to extradite
people, they are not protecting their territorial sovereignty but are
attempting to secure the return of fugitives."6 By securing a
return of fugitives through such means as abduction, states risk
alienating neighboring nations. In Alvarez-Machain, after the
Supreme Court confirmed the lower court's jurisdiction, the case
was remanded for trial. 67 The lower court judge concluded that
no substantive case existed against Alvarez-Machain and, thus,
dismissed all charges." Deviation from treaty applicability most
likely caused damage to the U.S.-Mexican relationship as the
Mexican government publicly reprimanded the U.S. for its
involvement in the Alvarez-Machain abduction. 69 Further, the
U.S. government now faces a multi-million dollar law suit for
damages suffered by Alvarez-Machain."7 ° Thus, extradition of
nationals is a critical concern in all extradition treaties.
III. Multilateral Extradition Treaties
Generally speaking, the extradition laws of many nations
provide that extradition may only be granted pursuant to a
treaty.' Thus, for those nations that share borders with more
than one nation or foresee the flow of their people to neighboring
nations, it may be wise to draft a multinational extradition
treaty.' 2 Furthermore, for nations in close geographic proximity
to one another, a multilateral extradition treaty may be more
165. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886). Rauscher was
decided on the same day as Ker, supra note'154. The court in Rauscher concluded
that if a requesting nation violated an extradition treaty in bringing a fugitive
before a court, the defendant must be repatriated. Id. Although the Court has
reviewed several extradition cases, it has yet to specifically characterize a violation
of an extradition treaty. Alvarez-Machain, supra notes 4, 151-64, and accompany-
ing text.
166. Id.
167. Alvarez-Machain, supra note 4, at 670.
168. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 971 U.S. 310 (1992).
169. Lauter, supra note 150.
170. Patrick J. McDonnell, Scars of an Abduction Courts: A Mexican Physician
Forcibly Taken to the United States and Imprisoned is Suing the Governmeni for
$20 Million, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995, at 31.
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 475 cmt. b (1990). Some nations permit extradition in the absence of
a treaty. Id. In such instances, extradition is based on reciprocity and the
incorporation of the dual criminality doctrine. Id.
172. The European Union has already anticipated the movement of terrorists
and has ratified the Council of Europe's European Convention of the Suppression
of Terrorism which authorizes extradition of terrorists between Member nations.
Written Question to the Council of European Communities, 1990 O.J. (C 303) 38.
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effective and justifiable."' As an example, suppose three nations
share borders such that the border of state A touches the physical
border of state B and state B shares a border with state C. If the
extradition laws of the three nations are very different, a fugitive
could plan his escape to the nation least likely to extradite pursuant
to its extradition treaty. A multilateral treaty which provides for
similar treatment of fugitives apprehended in all three nations
would ameliorate this scenario.
Several groups of nations have ratified multilateral extradition
treaties.74 As of 1990, the European Union was very concerned
about the harmonization of extradition procedures because two
nations had not ratified the European Convention on Extradition
of 1957.' In 1992, with the execution of the Single European
Act, this problem was solved by the unified extradition treaty.
1 76
Nations that are not a unified economic unit also have
discussed multilateral extradition treaties." Therefore, although
the United States, Canada, and Mexico are members of a multilat-
eral trade agreement instead of an economic union, a discussion of
the multilateral extradition treaty enacted by the European
Union17' and the multilateral extradition treaty proposed by the
Afro-Asian179 world is instructive.
The European Convention on Extradition1" obligates con-
173. GEOFF GILBERT, AsPECTS OF EXTRADmION LAW 20-25 (1991).
174. All of the multilateral extradition treaties drafted will not be discussed in
this comment. Nonetheless, some of these extradition treaties include: The Arab
Convention of 1952, reprinted in BEDI, supra note 19, at 218 [hereinafter Arab
Convention]; European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, 359 U.N.T.S.
276 [hereinafter European Convention on Extradition]; Inter-American Conven-
tion on Extradition, Feb. 25, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 723; The Afro-American Convention
of 1961, reprinted in BEDI, supra note 19, at 247 [hereinafter Afro-Asian Treaty];
The Benelux Convention of 1962, reprinted in BEDI, supra note 19, at 257.
175. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 174; Afro-Asian Treaty,
supra note 174.
176. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 174.
177. Arab Convention, supra note 174, 218-24.
178. The current extradition treaty in force is basically the same as the
multilateral treaty which was promoted by the Community in 1990, and now in
effect for the Union. Written Question No. 1236/90, 1990 O.J.C. (C 303) 38.
179. Afro-Asian Treaty, supra note 174.
180. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 174, at 273. An
additional protocol to the 1957 European Convention on Extradition was enacted
in 1975. Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, Aug. 20, 1979,
E.T.S. 86, 24 I.L.M. 1505 [hereinafter Protocol]. This Protocol excludes human
rights violations and war crimes from the list of extraditable offenses. Id. The
Protocol further defines when extradition can be refused on the ground that the
fugitive has already been tried in the requested nation. Id. Subsequently, in 1978,
another Protocol was added to the Convention. This Protocol further develops the
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tracting parties to surrender all persons sought for an offense or for
the completion of a sentence."' Similar to other bilateral trea-
ties, the purpose of this multilateral treaty is to return fugitives in
an effort to decrease crime. However, the treaty's specific purpose
is to achieve greater unity between its members.1 2
In contrast, the Afro-Asian multilateral treaty states within its
first article that five nations, Burma, Ceylon, India, Japan, and
Pakistan, were in favor of bilateral extradition treaties1 3 Only
two of the nations, Iraq and the United Arab Republic, endorsed
a multilateral treaty,"s while Indonesia did not express a
view.'85 Therefore, while there is an indication in the European
multilateral treaty that the agreement will not only control crime
but also will unify some European nations, this may not be the case
in the Afro-Asian multilateral treaty since no policy of a unified
fight against crime is stated.
Article 2 of the European Convention treaty fails to provide
a list of extraditable offenses.".. However, like the Mexican and
Canadian extradition treaties, crimes which are punishable by a
minimum period of at least one year are extraditable."8 In
contrast, the Afro-Asian treaty provides three alternatives for
extraditable offenses."l The first alternative sets the minimum
prison sentence at three years." 9 The second alternative requires
a one year punishment term which includes the extradition of
crimes of accessory and attempt.'9 Finally, alternative three
provides a schedule of extraditable crimes.91
category of fiscal offenses, judgments in absentia, and amnesty. Second Protocol
to the European Convention on Extradition, Mar. 17, 1978, E.T.S. 98, 24 I.L.M.
1505.
181. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 174, at 274.
182. The term "members" refers to members of the Council of Europe. Id. at
274.
183. Afro-Asian Treaty, supra note 174.
184. Id.
185. Id. A possible explanation for the difference in positions is that Iraq and
the United Arab Republic, were not as powerful in terms of political might
compared to Burma, Ceylon, India, Japan and Pakistan. Therefore, these stronger
nations likely believed that they could negotiate separate bilateral treaties that
included provisions in their favor.
186. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 174, art. 2.
187. The article also states that fugitives who have already received a sentence
are extraditable only if the sentence is longer than four months. Id.
188. Afro-Asian Treaty, supra note 174, art. 2.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. The schedule includes 18 crimes. Id. art. 2. The extraditable offenses
include (1) homicide; (2) attempt to murder; (3) causing miscarriage and
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In both multilateral treaties, a special provision excludes
extradition based on military or political offenses."l The Europe-
an. multilateral treaty goes further and excludes from extraditable
offenses those offenses based on the fugitive's race, religion,
nationality, or political opinion.'93 Additionally, both treaties
prohibit extraditing nationals of the requested nation who are
requested for extradition. 4 Furthermore, according to the
Asian-African model, if a fugitive is abducted, the nation from
which the fugitive was abducted may demand his return.95
In conjunction with the notion of cooperation between the
signatory nations, the European Convention includes a special
provision regarding capital punishment.'9 6 If the requested nation
does not "normally carry out" the death penalty for a certain
offense, extradition may be refused unless the requesting party
provides sufficient assurances that the death penalty will not be
abandonment of child; (4) kidnapping, abduction, slavery and forced labor; (5)
rape and unnatural offenses; (6) theft, extortion, robbery and dacoity; (7) criminal
misappropriation and criminal breach of trust; (8) cheating; (9) mischief; (10)
forgery, using forged documents and other offenses relating to false documents;
(11) offenses relating to coins and stamps; (12) piracy by law of nations committed
on board or against a vessel of a foreign state; (13) sinking or destroying a vessel
at sea or attempting or conspiring to do so; (14) assault on board a vessel on the
high seas with intent to destroy life or to do grievous bodily harm; (15) revolt or
conspiracy to revolt by two or more persons on board a vessel on the high seas
against the authority of the master; (16) smuggling of gold, gold manufactures,
diamonds, and other precious stones or of any narcotic substances; (17) immoral
traffic in women and girls; (18) any offense which may, from time to time, be
officially specified either by all states or specifically one or more states.
192. Afro-Asian Treaty, supra note 174, art. 2. European Convention on
Extradition, supra note 174, art. 11.
193. This exception to the list of extraditable offenses is noteworthy because it
takes into account the political and social differences of the signatory nations.
European Convention on Extradition, supra note 174, arts. 4 and 11. Each nation
may have inherent social problems revolving around political issues. Id.
Therefore, as the nations have agreed to unify themselves, they are taking
responsibility for one another by providing refuge to European citizens. Id.
. 194. Article 6 of the European Convention gives each contracting party a right
to refuse extradition of its own nationals. European Convention on Extradition,
supra note 174, art. 6. Furthermore, each nation may define the term national for
treaty purposes. Id. Allowing each nation to define national indicates that aliens,
legal or illegal, also may be extradited once they enter a nation that has signed the
convention. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 174, art. 6. The
Afro-Asian treaty does not indicate any special definition for national but states
that extradition shall not be refused because the fugitive is not a national. Afro-
Asian Treaty, supra note 174.
195. Afro-Asian Treaty, supra note 174, art. 21.
196. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 174, art. 11.
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imposed.' 97 However, this Convention permits a nation to refuse
extraditing, even if it tolerates the death penalty.1 98 The nation
may evaluate the death penalty and alleged crime in accordance
with its own law.199 If the law in the requested nation would not
impose the death penalty for the fugitive's crime, extradition may
be refused. Similar to the United States v. Jamieson" case, this
provision may be problematic because the extraditing nation judges
the appropriateness of another nation's law. If crime and punish-
ment are dealt with somewhat similarly in the signatory nations,
however, such a judgment should not cause problems.21 None-
theless, it may be argued that a state should not blindly accept the
laws of another nation if those laws are considered barbaric or
uncivilized.2' Although challenging the law of another nation
may seem to be a just response with respect to individual human
rights, such adjudication on a case by case basis may be destructive
in terms of international relations.
The European and Afro-Asian multilateral treaties address
issues not contained in most bilateral extradition treaties. For
example, article 23 of the European treaty permits the extraditing
nation to request a translation of a document into a language of its
choice.2 3  Additionally, the European 4  and Afro-Asian'
treaties include articles describing their relationship with other
bilateral treaties.' According to article 28 of the European
197. Id.
198. Article 11 reads:
If the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by
death under the law of the requesting party, and if in respect of such
offense the death penalty is not provided for by the law of the requested
Party or is not normally carried out, extradition may be refused unless
the requesting party gives such assurance as the requested party considers
sufficient that the death-penalty will not be carried out.
European Convention on Extradition, supra note 174, art. 11.
199. Id.
200. Jamieson, supra note 2, at 465. See also supra notes 68-97 and accompany-
ing text.
201. The European Union prides itself in fighting crime as a unified force as
much of its crime policy revolves around international agreements such as the
Council of Europe's European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism as
signed in 1978 prior to the formation of the Union. See Written Question No.
1236/90, supra note 178.
202. See Kindler, supra note 51.
203. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 174.
204. Id.
205. Afro-Asian Treaty, supra note 174, art. 2.
206. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 174, art. 28; Afro-Asian
Treaty, supra note 174, art. 30.
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Convention, the multilateral treaty supersedes any bilateral treaty,
convention, or agreement governing extradition between any two
signatory nations.2°7 However, the treaty does permit another
group of two or more nations to extradite based on indistinguish-
able laws provided that the signatory nations regulate the law with
respect to this multilateral treaty.2°  The Afro-Asian treaty does
not require compliance with the multilateral agreement, but permits
the two nations to apply the most suitable provisions from either
a bilateral or multilateral agreement.'
IV. Why Propose a NAFTA Multilateral Extradition Treaty?
In order to appreciate NAFTA, it must be viewed as an
agreement involving trading partners representing billions of
people. Business deals will be consummated, laws will change, and
trade will grow. 210 However, it is projected that illegal immigra-
tion will increase by one hundred percent.211 Also, Canadians are
worried about the effects NAFTA will have on their nation.
Mexico is concerned about the growth of its economy and has been
willing to make numerous concessions to reach the bargaining table
as a formidable player.2 3 It appears that if the United States
hopes to benefit from NAFTA,214 this may be the appropriate
time for the United States to secure NAFTA's success through a
multilateral extradition treaty.
To propose such a multilateral treaty, the United States must
determine the purpose of the treaty beginning with an international
law analysis. 215 Beyond the purpose of the treaty, some reflection
must be given to the historical significance of the instant U.S. -
Canada and U.S. - Mexico extradition treaties. Once the guidance
of history is considered, and a new multilateral treaty is proposed
207. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 174, art. 28.
208. Id.
209. Afro-Asian Treaty, supra note 174, art. 30.
210. NAFTA Crime Fears Surface, THE FIN. POST, Sept. 29, 1993, at 6.
211. Nelson, supra note 11, at 987.
212. David Nicholson-Lord, Civilization for Sale; Free Trade Sounds Good, But
Who Benefits? Not the Poor, nor the Environment, nor us, says David Nicholson-
Lord, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 12, 1993, at 21.
213. Christina Tierney, NAFTA Drives Mexican Law Enforcement Spree -
Critics, Reuters World Serv., June 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
WIRES File.
214. Maureen Huntley, High-Level Canadian and U.S. Purchasing Executives
Polled, Can. Newswire, Mar. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES
File.
215. See BEDI, supra note 19.
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using the age old art of looking to other multilateral treaties as
models, the United States should propose an extradition treaty
resolving concerns that Americans, Canadians, and Mexicans have
expressed about NAFTA. By attempting to address some of the
side effects of NAFTA, the economic treaty will be stronger and
more useful. For instance, extraneous factors such as crime will be
controlled with an extradition treaty. Further, in the absence of an
unified extradition treaty, no obligation for extradition exists.
The first U.S. - Canada extradition treaty, originally drafted by
the U.S. and U.K.,2 16 dealt with the social and economic issue of
slavery and worked to resolve its resulting criminal effects.217
Therefore, the origin of U.S. - Canada extradition relations began
with negotiations and promises made by a nation, the U.K., that
did not share a physical border with both Canada and the U.S.218
Once a treaty was enacted solely between the United States
and Canada, Canada used the extradition treaty as an expression
of its territorial independence.219 Canadians became concerned
with the social problem of bounty hunters and consequently used
politics to ensure the end of the practice.2' Canada further
asserted its power to control their territory through judicial
determinations.221
Following the adoption of the Charter,2" Canada began to
explore the Charter's effect on all those who entered the nation.
The Canadian courts have tried to restrain themselves from
interfering with executive extradition decisions.2" However, the
death penalty' and minimum sentencing laws22 cause prob-
lems in extradition cases because the Canadian criminal system
differs from the United States system. Therefore it should be no
surprise that Canadians have criticized the "reform" of Mexico's
legal system.226
216. 1842 Slave Trade Extradition Treaty, supra note 25.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Swardson, supra note 1. The Quebec appellate court's Jamieson
decision demonstrates the ideological social and legal differences between the U.S.
and Canada, including contrasting views of just punishment in the respective states.
220. Baker, supra note 3.
221. See Kindler, supra note 51.
222. The Charter, supra note 53.
223. Schmidt, supra note 56, 33 C.C.C.3d at 212.
224. Pak, supra note 41.
225. Morning Edition, supra note 72.
226. Diane Francis, Mexican Road to Reform No Easy Route, THE FIN. POST,
Mar. 25, 1994, § 1, at 7.
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Canadians hesitate to say that the Mexican criminal system is
reformed since business people are kidnapped and reports indicate
that Mexican officials are corrupt.2 7 Therefore, to allow an illegal
Mexican alien to enter Canada and then be sent through the
Canadian judicial system may cause practical problems similar to
those occurring between the United States and Canada in the
United States v. Jamieson case. Thus, for the Canadian courts to
delve into Mexican law without the guidance of an extradition
treaty might be disastrous.
In the case of the U.S.-- Mexico extradition treaty, the purpose
again was to prevent crime. 2 In order to facilitate this purpose,
the early treaties permitted a third - party state to petition for
extradition of a fugitive through the United States or Mexico. 29
With its concentrated focus, the nations set up conditions that
would solve problems if a fugitive committed a crime outside either
nation's territory and then fled. If a Canadian committed a crime
in his home country and realized that he could easily travel into the
United States and then into Mexico, the U.S. - Mexico extradition
could possibly facilitate his return to Canada. However, there have
been no reported cases of the applicability of this provision of the
treaty.
One of the biggest differences between the Mexican and
Canadian extradition treaties is that the Mexican treaty still
incorporates a schedule of offenses' while the Canadian treaty
has completely eliminated a schedule.23 This may be problemat-
ic. For example, abortion is illegal in Mexico, 2 2  but not in
Canada.33 In the United States, abortion laws vary from state to
state. Nonetheless, while Mexico's extradition schedule lists the
227. Les Whittington, Torture and free trade: Mexico, which could soon have
closer ties to Canada through free trade, continues to be a country where almost
anyone who is arrested runs the risk of police torture, THE VANCOUVER SUN, Nov.
9, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-U.S. File.
228. 1899 Extradition Treaty, supra note 98.
229. Id.
230. 1899 Extradition Treaty, supra notes 98, 100, 101, 105, 106 and accompany-
ing text.
231. Extradition Protocol, supra note 28, at 423.
232. Christine Tierney, PAN Candidate's Agenda Worries Mexican Feminists,
Reuters World Serv., Aug. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File
(reporting that although abortion is illegal, the procedure is still performed in
Mexico).
233. One in Four Pregnancies End in Abortions in Canada, Reuters World
Serv., Oct. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File. In 1988 the
Supreme Court of Canada struck down a law prohibiting the operation of private
abortion clinics in Canada. Id.
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crime of abortion2 as an extraditable offense, Canada's one year
minimum imprisonment law would not apply to abortion proce-
dures: Consequently, the list of extraditable offenses among the
NAFTA nations are not the same. However, this problem may be
solved by looking at the recent trend in the United States - Mexico
extradition treaty.
The list of crimes in the appendix of the Mexico extradition
treaty is supplemented by a clause which states that crimes
punishable by more than one year imprisonment are also extradit-
able. 35 Therefore, it may be that the Mexican - U.S. relationship
is advancing into the stages contemplated by the Mutual Legal
Assistance Cooperation Treaty 6 which calls for cooperation in
all criminal matters. The offenses listed in the appendix can not in
terms of practicality be exhaustive: the nations have agreed to aid
one another not only in the capture of fugitives but also in the
formal procedures of prosecution.
Inrelation to the United States interpretation of the Mexican -
United States extradition treaty, it is clear that Mexico protests the
abduction of its citizens. '  Prior to the signing of NAFTA,
President Bush pledged that the United States would not partici-
pate in the abduction of Mexican nationals." Consequently, this
created. a tense and difficult situation because the United States
Supreme Court rejected any due process considerations of the
Mexican national.39 Mexico realized that the terms of its extradi-
tion treaty did not apply when the United States manipulated its
international agreements and the judiciary indirectly supported such
activity even though the abduction was "shocking."2'
The Canadian authorities used the words "shocking and
unconscionable" to describe the Michigan minimum sentencing
rules in the United States v. Jamieson case. The United States
Supreme Court noted that abduction of foreign nationals is
"shocking."241  Not surprisingly, Mexico is dissatisfied with the
234. Factor, supra note 24, at 276.
235. 1899 Extradition Treaty, supra note 98.
236. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 137.
237. Salinas and Bush Try to Iron Out Trade and Extradition Matters, Notimex
Mex. News Serv., July 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
238. Id.
239. Alvarez-Machain, supra note 4, at 661, 670.
240. Id. at 669.
241. Id.
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current extradition relationship it has with the United States.242
In addition, Canada was displeased with the United States
participation in the Alvarez-Machain abduction.243 Likewise,
Americans may not be content with the Canadian courts delay and
current rejection to repatriate a U.S. citizen accused of a drug
offense.2'
Thus, while the history and development of the Mexican and
Canadian extradition treaties share commonalities, the resulting
treaties are unique. But the historical and judicial interpretation of
the two treaties demonstrates a possible avenue of compromise that
will result in a necessary supplement to NAFTA : a NAFTA
multilateral extradition treaty. If a multilateral treaty is not agreed
upon, drug cartels may further use the free trading zone to enhance
business.245 NAFTA, however, may provide a mechanism to
control crime, and more specifically, drug trafficking by assuring no
escape from justice for fugitives.2'
V. The New Multilateral Treaty
Though the particulars of any multilateral treaty require much
political negotiation,247 there are specific issues that must be
addressed. These issues include: (1) purpose; (2) extraditable
offenses; (3) excluded extraditable offenses; (4) when nationals are
extraditable; (5) abduction; (6) death penalty; and (7) language.
The purpose of the new multilateral treaty must be to deter
and suppress crime while providing an orderly process between the
U.S., Canada, and Mexico to maintain friendly relations.
24
Furthermore, the nations may consider incorporating a purpose of
242. To ameliorate the situation, the United States brought Mexico to the
bargaining table to discuss the matter of kidnappings, bounter hunters and
abductions of extraditable persons. New U.S. - Mexico Extradition Treaty Bars
Cross Border Kidnappings, supra note 144, at 2A. Further, prior to the signing of
NAFTA, the United States and Mexico agreed to talk about extradition policies.
Salinas & Bush Try to Iron Out Trade & Extradition Matters, supra note 237.
243. Donald MacRae & Maxwell Cohen, International Law Badly Shaken by
U.S. Ruling, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 28, 1992, at A9.
244. See Swardson, supra note 1.
245. NAFTA Crime Fears Surface, supra note 210, at 6.
246. NAFTA Would Boost U.S.-Mexican Crime Fight, Reuters World Serv.,
Oct. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File. Janet Reno states
NAFTA would boost U.S. - Mexico crime fighting efforts. Id.
247. This conclusion is drawn from the discussion of the treaties's historical
development. See supra notes 19-47, 98-132 and accompanying text.
248. This conclusion in drawn from the common historical purposes of the
bilateral extradition treaties. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
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facilitating and strengthening NAFTA by suppressing crime. If the
nations hope to strengthen their economic futures, extraditable
offenses must be broadly defined. In the past, nations have been
open to the one year imprisonment standard which expands the list
of extraditable crimes. 249 Additionally, a multilateral extradition
treaty may provide, via political pressure, more efficient criminal
systems within the NAFTA nations. After NAFTA's ratification,
Mexico has felt the political pressure from concerns about its law
enforcement and as a result has attempted to create more law and
order within its borders.
Nonetheless, political offenses should continue to be excluded
from the list of offenses because this category has been agreed
upon in the pasty ° In order to avoid another Alvarez - Mach-
ain251 situation, and to further cooperation between nations, when
a national may not be extradited must be specifically articulated.
In addition, abduction should be prohibited because such a
provision: (1) would force nations to recognize their interrelation-
ship and (2) could indirectly require nations to create some equity
behind their criminal punishments. Further, a provision concerning
assurances against capital punishment should be included since
Canada has refused to extradite fugitives based on this issue.
Finally, like other multilateral extradition treaties, a language
provision must be included to facilitate procedures.
VII. Conclusion
The United States, Canada, and Mexico have agreed to align
themselves economically through NAFTA. Although some
repercussions of this alignment are not yet known, it is clear that
illegal immigration will increase. Undoubtedly, this transborder
movement of people will include fugitives.
While the nations have two bilateral treaties, these may not be
adequate. The existing treaties do not fully anticipate the entry of
Mexican fugitives into Canada and vice versa. Without an
extradition treaty, neither Canada nor Mexico currently have an
obligation to extradite. Therefore, a multilateral extradition treaty
would help control the illegal immigration resulting from NAFTA
and would result in a stronger more unified trading relationship.
249. 1889 Extradition Treaty, supra note 33.
250. Alvarez-Machain, supra note 4.
251. Id.
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The U.S. - Canada - Mexico multilateral extradition treaty
must address various issues. In particular, the treaty should address
abduction of nationals as well as capital punishment, because in
recent times, these have been areas of international concern for the
United States, Canada, and Mexico. Furthermore, if the nations
fail to implement a multilateral treaty, crime, as a NAFTA waste
product, may defeat its ultimate purpose. Finally, since extradition
is to serve justice, NAFTA should further justice by being the
impetus of a multilateral extradition treaty.
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